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A Remark on Attitudes De Dicto and De Se 
Shuguo Tang1 
Abstract 
This is a two-fold response to the theory of attitudes presented by David Lewis 
in his paper Attitudes De Dicto and De Se. Lewis’ theory is on the specification 
of attitudes. On the one hand, it is obvious in his text that Lewis attempts to 
specify the objects of attitudes uniformly. I will argue that the attempt fails. 
The reason is that from Lewis’ formulation of an attitude, we cannot read the 
object of it. On the other hand, Lewis’ account could have been a theory on 
the specification of attitudes without any commitment on what the objects of 
attitudes are. I will argue that this does not hold either. In order to do that, I 
will construct pairs of cases in which the attitude in one case has the same 
formulization as in the other case according to Lewis’ theory. I will argue that 
in one such pair of cases, the focus of the attitude in one case can be different 
from that in the other, while the Lewisian theory of attitudes does not help to 
specify an attitude’s focus.  
 
1 Introduction 
In his paper Attitudes De Dicto and De Se, David Lewis gives an account which claims 
that what an attitude is about can be specified uniformly in terms of properties. In 
this paper, I attempt to challenge Lewis’ account.   
We have good reasons to declare Lewis’ success if his account establishes that 
properties should be treated as objects of attitudes. However, I will argue that his 
attempted establishment does not work. At the first stage of my challenge, I will 
examine Lewis’ explicit claim that it is better to hold that objects of attitudes are 
properties than that they are propositions (Lewis, p.514). I will argue that Lewis’ 
analysis does not exclude the possibility that objects of attitudes are something other 
than properties.  
2 Lewis on why properties, not propositions, are the objects 
of attitudes 
In the following discussion, I will adhere to Lewis’ notion that a proposition can be 
identified with the set of all possible worlds where this proposition is true. For 
example, we can imagine possible worlds in which grass is red and possible worlds 
in which grass is green. The proposition ‘grass is green’ is therefore the set of all 
possible worlds in which grass is green.  
It seems that objects of attitudes are not uniform. Take desire as the paradigm 
attitude. I want a Shiba Inu and a good grade for my mathematics class. It does not 
make sense to place a Shiba Inu and getting a decent grade into one single category. 
So, if objects of desires are uniform, then my object of desire had better not be a 
Shiba Inu or getting a decent grade. One group of popular candidates for objects of 
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attitudes would be propositions. When I want a Shiba Inu, what I want is that 'I own 
a Shiba Inu' be true. When I want to get a decent grade, what I want is that 'I get a 
decent grade' be true. Apply the same line of paraphrasing mutatis mutandis to other 
attitudes like beliefs and knowledge, now it seems that my objects of desires are 
pretty much in order. Yet, despite the seeming versatility of propositions, Lewis 
claims that they do not capture all conceivable objects of desires and that properties 
are better candidates. Lewis takes two steps toward this claim. First, he argues that 
properties can account for at least as many cases of attitudes as propositions; and 
second, there are some cases that cannot be handled by propositions but can be 
handled by properties (Lewis, p.514).  
Lewis observes that each proposition corresponds to a property of inhabiting a world 
which is a member of this proposition. Therefore, whenever we say one wants that P 
be true (where ‘P’ represents a proposition), it does as well to say that she wants to 
possess the property of inhabiting a world where P is true. Certainly, when I want 
that the earth be full of Shiba Inus, I want to inhabit a world in which the earth is 
full of Shiba Inus.  
If objects of desires are propositions, then the more consistent propositions one 
includes in one’s desires, the smaller the set of possible worlds satisfying one’s desire 
is, until the conjunction of propositions desired determines a single world. At that 
time, there is nothing left to be desired. Further, there are no desires left to be 
satisfied once the character of the world is completely specified. Nevertheless, Lewis 
argues that there is something other than propositions that can be desired. Lewis 
asks us to imagine a world in which there are two Gods, one of which lives on the 
top of the highest mountain and the other which lives on the top of the coldest 
mountain, neither of which knows on which mountain they are situated. We assume 
that the desires of the two Gods specify the same class of worlds. However, even 
though this set includes the desires of the truth of 'such-and-such a God lives on the 
highest mountain' and 'such­and­such a God lives on the coldest mountain’, it does 
not determine which God wants to live on which mountain. Suppose that one of them 
suddenly wants to live on the highest mountain, he would not contradict his previous 
desires, for he wants the same world still to be actual but only wants a specific 
location in the world. That is to say, this further desire cannot be accounted for by 
propositions which make the world distinct, but by the property of being located on 
the highest mountain which is within the world in question. (Lewis, p.529) Likewise, 
when I want to own a Shiba Inu, I do not merely want to inhabit a world in which 
someone satisfying the description of Shuguo Tang owns a Shiba Inu, but I also want 
that I am one of them. Hence, there are objects of desires beyond the scope of 
propositions.  
In this section, I have presented Lewis’ motivations for arguing that cases of desires 
can be specified in terms of properties uniformly. That is to say, a subject S desires 
X, if and only if the Lewisian formulation of the attitude ‘S intends to be assigned 
such­and­such property Y’ holds. For example, when I desire that a person called 
Shuguo Tang owns a Shiba Inu, I desire to be assigned the property of inhabiting a 
world in which Shuguo Tang owns a Shiba Inu. But when I desire that I myself own 
a Shiba Inu, I desire to be assigned the property of owning a Shiba Inu which 
distinguishes me as having this privilege. However, one might question whether 
properties as Lewis ‘conceives them’, suffice as objects of attitudes in the general 
case. In §3, I take up this objection and argue that Lewis’ analysis does not exclude 
the possibility that objects of attitudes are something other than properties. 
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3 Can properties account for the focus of an attitude? 
Consider this statement: a camera takes a photo A if and only if it catches such and 
such combination of light L. While it makes sense to say, appealing to the 
combination of light, that we have a uniform explanation of what goes on when a 
camera takes a photo, it does not follow that the objects of the photo are of one single 
kind. Instead, a photo contains the images of many different objects: a pig, a cat, a 
tower, the sky, the sun, etc. Similarly, the physical process of eating an apple can 
also be described fully in terms of how atoms of the apple interact with my mouth, 
but it is the apple that I am eating, not the atoms. In the same way, even though we 
fully and uniformly describe, as far as Lewis’s conception of properties is concerned, 
what is going on when one is desiring (using a Lewisian formulation of the attitude), 
the objects of desires may still be abundant. Further, even if we allow that 
specifications of attitudinal objects supervene on Lewisian formulations of attitudes, 
we would still need to work out how the former corresponds to the latter2. 
Lewis’ account could have been a theory attempting to specify what our attitudes are 
about without postulating properties as attitudinal objects. In the following, I will 
argue that, if Lewis insists that a property is the set of objects that instantiate it, 
such an attempt cannot succeed either (Lewis, p.515).  
An attitude has a focus. What I call a focus is the feature of the attitudinal object on 
which my attention is directed. A successful theory of what attitudes are about 
should be able to specify the focus of an attitude. Given Lewis’ notion of properties, 
if properties P and Q pick out the same particular object, then their Lewisian 
descriptions cannot be different, i.e. ‘S intends to be assigned P’ is the same as ‘S 
intends to be assigned Q’. The problem for Lewis’ account is that, in many cases, a 
pair of properties P and Q can specify the same object while the focus specified by 
the P-formulation is different from that specified by the Q-formulation.  
A Lewisian formulation of an attitude, granted that it uniquely corresponds to the 
attitudinal object, does not necessarily tell you what the attitudinal focus is, just as 
a complete description of a photo (by specifying the relevant combination of light 
perhaps) cannot tell you the focus of creation and appreciation intended. For 
example, in the same work of photography, the shape of the Statue of Liberty could 
be the focus or the pose of the Statue of Liberty could be the focus. Importantly, a 
complete description of the physical image does not determine what the focus of the 
work is.  
For a pair of properties that pick out the same object, I can think of three cases in 
which it seems that one specifies a different focus from that specified by the other. 
In the first case, one has an attitude towards inhabiting the world in which a 
necessary proposition is true. For example, John may desire to be assigned the 
property of living in a world in which 2+2=4. Mary may desire to be assigned the 
property of living in a world in which 3+3=6. In the second case, the instantiation of 
one of the properties necessitates instantiation of the other property. For instance, 
in a paradigmatic example of the second case, John wishes that the triangle in front 
of him is equilateral while Mary wishes that it is equiangular. Finally, in the third 
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case, the same figure can be conceptualised as different artworks. For example, a 
photo of the Statue of Liberty can be appreciated as a good work for The Shape of the 
Statue of Liberty, or it can be highly regarded as The Pose of the Statue of Liberty. 
Under the former title, the focus of the audiences’ appreciation is drawn to the 
geometrical patterns of the photo, while the second title guides the audiences to 
attend to an animate element of the Statue of Liberty. It could be the case that given 
the same pose, the photo shows the same shape and vice versa. Lewis himself realizes 
(and promptly dismisses) the problems in the first and the second cases (Lewis, 
p.515) but since dismissing these cases as marginal is not a satisfying approach, it 
is worth considering all three cases in more detail.  
One might attempt to fix the difficulties in the first and the second cases by appealing 
to ignorance. In this line of argument, for the first case, if John were ignorant of the 
co-extensionality of the properties ‘inhabiting the world in which 2+2=4’ and 
‘inhabiting the world in which 3+3=6’, then John would probably think that Mary 
and he desired to be located in different worlds; for the second case, again, suppose 
John and Mary were ignorant about the co-extensionality of the properties ‘being an 
equilateral triangle’ and ‘being an equiangular triangle’. One could even imagine a 
quarrel between them on whether an equilateral triangle is better than an 
equiangular triangle.  In other words, the focus of John’s attitude can be the same 
as that of Mary’s, even though they do not think so. The argument from ignorance 
not only owes us an explanation to why even a mathematician can have an 
impression of focal difference struck by the first and the second case, but also 
threatens to isolate knowledge as a special species of attitude. But for now, what is 
interesting about this line of argument, is that, whatever the verdict about the role 
of ignorance in certain cases, the third case introduced in the past paragraph avoids 
this concern altogether.  
Suppose that John and Mary took a photo of the back of the Statue of Liberty. John 
and Mary dispute upon whether to name the photo The Shape of the Statue of Liberty 
or The Pose of the Statue of Liberty. John argues that looking at the back of the Statue 
of Liberty, the delicate corrugated shape of the robe stands out in contrast with the 
relatively plain pose shown, as from this angle we cannot even see her with a book 
at her left hand. Mary argues that the patterns of the back of the Statue of Liberty 
are much less abundant than that of the front and such a simple arrangement 
enables us to appreciate the power of the pose. So, we have the shape-formulation 
of John’s attitude that John appreciates being assigned the property of entertaining 
the photo of the statue of liberty showing such-and-such shape and a similar pose-
formulation of Mary’s attitude.  
Both shape- and pose-formulations seem to have a potential to specify a different 
focus from the other, but the focal difference cannot be explained by anyone’s 
ignorance of the properties’ co-extension. Both John and Mary know perfectly well 
that the shape-formulation and the pose-formulation necessitate each other. But 
when John and Mary are admiring the photo, given the arguments by them, we can 
see that the focus of John’s attitude is different from that of Mary’s.  
Different characterizations of the Statue of Liberty triggered by ‘shape’ and ‘pose’ may 
help explain and justify why the former specifies a different focus from that specified 
by the latter in the third case. Characterizations are potentially very personalised 
frames in which we attend to objects. For a same piece of cloud resembling an animal, 
it can be the case that a person attends to it as if it is a horse while another person 
attends to it as if it is a mule. That is to say, the former person characterises the 
cloud as horse-like while the latter characterises it as mule-like. In the case of the 
photograph, ‘Shape’ normally helps to trigger a characterization of the Statue of 
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Liberty regarding its geometrical patterns that guides our attention to that 
geometrical feature that is the focus for John’s attitude, while ‘pose’ triggers a 
characterization regarding that animate element that guides our attention to its 
anthropomorphic feature which is the focus for Mary’s attitude.  
There is no reason to think that different characterizations of an object cannot be 
triggered by other pairs of co-extensional properties. If so, then the focal difference 
in the first and the second case may also be explained and justified. For the first 
case, we can see the difference between necessary truths 2+2=4 and 3+3=6, since 
the calculation of the former requires four fingers and that of the latter requires two 
more. So, the characterization of a world triggered by the former fact can be different 
from that triggered by the latter. One might desire to inhabit a world in which 2+2=4 
while 3+3=5 because this person does not want to calculate with more than one 
hand. However insane, this is a conceivable attitude.  
In the second case, for the same triangle, since ‘equally long’ has a different meaning 
from ‘equally acute’, ‘equilateral triangle’ and ‘equiangular triangle’ can trigger 
different characterizations. Imagine that John and Mary have a very sharp triangle 
ABC designed to punch holes on a plain of wood. Here is how it works. The triangle 
shall be always perpendicular to the wooden plain. Starting with the segment AB on 
the wood, by evenly rotating it in order for AC to land on the plain, they punch a hole 
during the process with the angle BAC; then they turn AC evenly in order for BC to 
land on the plain and punch a hole during the process with the angle ACB, and so 
on… Now they have a series of holes on the wooden plain. Hoping that the distance 
between any two adjacent holes is equal, John expresses his wish for ABC to be an 
equilateral triangle. Hoping that each hole is equally deep, Mary express her wish for 
ABC to be an equiangular triangle. The focus of John’s wishing is the situation among 
angles’ acuteness in ABC, while the focus of Mary’s wishing is the situation 
concerning the segments’ lengths in ABC. However, such focal difference which can 
be triggered by characterisations of ABC as ‘being equilateral triangle’ and ‘being 
equiangular triangle’ cannot be captured by Lewis, since keeping the commitment 
that a property is defined by its extension, Lewis has to say that these two 
characterisations actually represent the same property.  
 
Conclusion 
To specify what an attitude is about, we need to know both the object of the attitude 
and the focus of the attitude. While Lewis’ formulation of an attitude corresponds to 
the object, I have argued that it does not necessarily establish that properties should 
be treated as attitudinal objects. It may be the case that we can in principle pick out 
specifications of the attitudinal object from Lewisian formulations since the former 
supervenes on the latter, but it may be a challenge for Lewis to provide us with 
standardized procedures to do so. Furthermore, since Lewis’ notion of property does 
not distinguish between a pair of co-extensional properties, his account is not 
sensitive to the focal difference between the properties. I conclude that Lewis’ account 
of what attitudes are about is incomplete until it can specify the attitudinal focus.  
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